I received an e-mail asking about this Luther quotation (and a similar discussion can be found here):
"We should carefully distinguish between a necessity of infallibility, and a necessity of coaction; since both good and evil men, though by their actions they fulfil the decree and appointment of God, yet are not forcibly constrained to do any thing but act willingly."
Secondary Sources
That's quite a hefty sentence. It's purported to come from Luther's Bondage of the Will (De Servo Arbitrio). A simple web search provides a couple of hits, most notably from Jerome Zanchius, Augustus Toplady, and William Shedd.
William G. T. Shedd (June 21, 1820 – November 17, 1894)
Luther (De Servo Arbitrio, cap. 44) thus distinguishes the two significations of necessity: "We should carefully distinguish between a necessity of infallibility [certainty] and a necessity of coercion; since both good and evil men, though by their actions they fulfil the decree and appointment of God, yet are not forcibly constrained to do anything but act willingly."
Augustus Toplady (November 4, 1740 – August 11, 1778)
My meaning is, that the prescience of God does not lay any coercive necessity on the wills of beings naturally free. For instance, man, even in his fallen state, is endued with a natural freedom of will ; yet he acts, from the first to the last moment of his life, in absolute subserviency (though, perhaps, he does not know it, nor design it) to the purposes and decrees of God concerning him: notwithstanding which, he is sensible of no compulsion, but acts as freely and voluntarily, as if he was jui juris, subject to no controul, and absolutely lord of himself. This made Luther*, after he had shewn how all things necessary and inevitably come to pass, in consequence of the sovereign will and infallible foreknowledge of God, say, that " We should carefully distinguish between a necessity of infallibility, and a necessity of coaction ; since both good and evil men, though by their actions they fulfil the decree and appointment of God, yet are not forcibly constrained to do any thing, but act willingly." (*DeServ. Arb. cap. 44)
Jerome Zanchius (February 2, 1516 – November 19, 1590)
POSITION 4. -The influence which the Divine foreknowledge has on the certain futurition of the things foreknown does not render the intervention of second causes needless, nor destroy the nature of the things themselves.
My meaning is, that the prescience of God does not lay any coercive necessity on the wills of beings naturally free. For instance, man, even in his fallen state, is endued with a natural freedom of will, yet he acts, from the first to the last moment of his life, in absolute subserviency (though, perhaps, he does not know it nor design it) to the purposes and decrees of God concerning him, notwithstanding which, he is sensible of no compulsion, but acts as freely and voluntarily as if he was sui juris, subject to no control and absolutely lord of himself. This made Luther,* after he had shown how all things necessarily and inevitably come to pass, in consequence of the sovereign will and infallible foreknowledge of God, say that "we should carefully distinguish between a necessity of infallibility and a necessity of coaction, since both good and evil men, though by their actions they fulfil the decree and appointment of God, yet are not forcibly constrained to do any thing, but act willingly."*De Serv. Arb. cap. 44.
Toplady is a translation of Zanchius (it's the same thing). I think this evidence is fairly consistent that Shedd was on the receiving end of what Zanchius put together. Given that Zanchius lived during the sixteenth century and that biographical information says he was familiar with Luther's writings, and that he was Reformed, Zanchius probably mined the quote himself from De Servo Arbitrio. In fact, he quotes Luther more than a few times in Observations On The Divine Attributes, the very work from which the quote in question comes. I mention this obvious fact simply from dealing with Romanist citations of Luther. Zanchius appears to have read Luther and quoted Luther. He appears to not be using a secondary source.
Documentation
De Serv. Arb. cap. 44 refers to the chapter /section divisions. It appears the earlier original chapter divisions weren't noted in the English edition of Luther's Works (vol. 33), they only refer back to the page numbering of WA 18. Similarly, the Packer /Johnston do the same. Older English translations do though present chapter / section numberings though nothing even remotely similar appears in section 44. For popular accessible versions of the Bondage of the Will, see this post. The Latin text from Lutheri Opera doesn't appear to have the chapter numbers. WA 18 is part of the Weimar set, and I didn't find any sort of section distinctions like "cap. 44".
Context
Something that is similar to this quote occurs in section 96 of one othe on-line earlier English translations:
Sect. 96.—AND now, how excellently does the Diatribe preserve liberty in harmony with necessity, where it says—"Nor does all necessity exclude "Free-will." For instance: God the Father begets a son, of necessity; but yet, He begets him willingly and freely, seeing that, He is not forced."—
Am I here, I pray you, disputing about compulsion and force? Have I not said in all my books again and again, that my dispute, on this subject, is about the necessity of immutability? I know that the Father begets willingly, and that Judas willingly betrayed Christ. But I say, this willing, in the person of Judas, was decreed to take place from immutability and certainty, if God foreknew it. Or, if men do not yet understand what I mean,—I make two necessities: the one a necessity of force, in reference to the act; the other a necessity of immutability in reference to the time. Let him, therefore, who wishes to hear what I have to say, understand, that I here speak of the latter, not of the former: that is, I do not dispute whether Judas became a traitor willingly or unwillingly, but whether or not it was decreed to come to pass, that Judas should will to betray Christ at a certain time infallibly predetermined of God!
In the Packer / Johnston translation they say "I distinguish two necessities: one I call necessity of force referring to action; the other I call necessity of infallibility, referring to time. Let him who hears me understand that I am speaking of the later, not the former..." Luther distinguishes between two necessities: The necessity of force (referring to action) and the necessity of infallibility (referring to time).
LW 33 translates this same passage as,
We know that the Father begets willingly, and that Judas betrayed Christ by an act of will; but we say this willing was certainly and infallibly going to occur in Judas himself if God foreknew it. Or if what I am saying is still not understood, let us have two sorts of necessity, one of force with reference to the work, the other of infallibility with reference to the time; and let anyone who listens to us understand that we are speaking of the latter, not of the former; that is to say, we are not discussing whether Judas became a traitor involuntarily or voluntarily, but whether at a time preordained by God it was bound infallibly to happen that Judas by an act of his will should betray Christ [LW 33:192].
That's at least the first part of the obscure quote. One possibility is that this was the only portion attributable to Luther. It could be the later part of the quote was a summary of Luther's argumentation, or that a quote mark was misplaced in the text of Zanchius.
The Latin text from the sources quoted above don't have anything that look like the second half of the sentence:
The second part of the quote states, "since both good and evil men, though by their actions they fulfil the decree and appointment of God, yet are not forcibly constrained to do any thing but act willingly." Something similar to this, at least in sentiment appeared in the 1567 Jena version, which I've written on previously. This version would have been published when Zanchius was 51 years old. So far, I've only been able to determine the possiblity that Zanchius published his Strasbourg treatise on predestination in 1562 (Toplady republished it as Observations On The Divine Attributes). Luther states: "The will, whether it be God's or man's, does what it does, good or bad, under no compulsion, but just as it wants or pleases, as if totally free. Yet the will of God, which rules over our mutable will, is changeless and sure..."(Packer / Johnston translation, p. 81). Unfortunately, this section was added to the 1567 version, so Zanchius would not have had it in its current form to cite from in 1562.
This would make the quote read:
"I distinguish two necessities: one I call necessity of force referring to action; the other I call necessity of infallibility, referring to time." (Page 220 Packer / Johnston)
"The will, whether it be God's or man's, does what it does, good or bad, under no compulsion, but just as it wants or pleases, as if totally free. Yet the will of God, which rules over our mutable will, is changeless and sure..." (Page 81 Packer / Johnston)
Conclusion
The only way to really know for sure what Zanchius is referring to is to know which edition of De Servo Arbitrio he used in Observations on the Divine Attributes. He mentions Luther often. He mentions sections 8,143, 146, 147, 153, 160, 161. If section 44 is accurate, it's not likely that the text from LW 33:192 (or the Latin from WA 18:720-721) corresponds to the first part of the sentence. That would place the sentence toward the end of De Servo Arbitrio, but 44 would place it toward the beginning.
I'm inclined to think section 44 refers to WA 614-616, (LW 33:37-38; Packer / Johnston 80-81). The quote indeed appears to be from two different places in the text (as noted above). The first part of the sentence come later in the text, while the second part comes earlier. But the dating of Zanchius's treatise makes it impossible that he quoted the second part of the sentence from the 1567 Jena text, so it will remain a mystery quote!
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